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The main objective of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of ﬁscal equalisation
instruments in Croatia. Fiscal equalisation policy in Croatia is conducted through the
personal income tax revenue sharing and the distribution of current grants from
the central government budget to regional and local government units. However, the
application of these instruments often relies on criteria that are not economic in nat-
ure. Therefore, this paper tests the hypothesis of the ineffectiveness of ﬁscal equalisa-
tion system in Croatia. The Gini coefﬁcients are used to measure inequalities in
ﬁscal capacities of local government units before and after the application of ﬁscal
equalisation instruments. If the value of the Gini coefﬁcient after the application of
certain equalisation instrument is lower than before, that instrument is effective in
alleviating ﬁscal inequalities and vice versa. It is found that the Croatian ﬁscal
equalisation system mitigates local ﬁscal inequalities, but with the negligible effect.
Keywords: local government units; ﬁscal capacity; ﬁscal inequalities; ﬁscal
equalisation; Gini coefﬁcient; Croatia
JEL classiﬁcation: H77, D63
1. Introduction
In line with the transfer of responsibility for the provision of certain public functions
from central to lower tiers of government (e.g. local government units – LGUs), the
central government gives away part of the revenue for their ﬁnancing. If subnational
governments lack sufﬁcient resources to ﬁnance ﬁscal needs they face a ﬁscal gap (the
difference between the ﬁscal capacity and ﬁscal needs) resulting from the vertical ﬁscal
imbalance. Similarly, the differences in ﬁscal capacities and/or needs of administrative
units at the same level (tier) of government cause horizontal ﬁscal inequalities. Due to
the very serious political consequences that long-term ﬁscal inequalities could have, a
model for alleviating ﬁscal inequalities (ﬁscal equalisation model) is an imperative of
each ﬁscally decentralised system.
In order to alleviate ﬁscal inequalities between LGUs, Croatian authorities have
employed different ﬁscal instruments, applied according to the status of LGUs in the
ﬁnancing system. LGUs that are considered ﬁnancially weaker enjoy the preferential
treatment. Surprisingly, ﬁnancially weaker LGUs are identiﬁed based on their geo-
graphic location rather than ﬁnancial criteria (areas of special national concern –
ASNC,1 hill and mountain areas – HMA,2 and LGUs on islands with an agreement on
joint ﬁnancing of capital projects for the development of the island). The EU accession
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process has encouraged Croatia to deﬁne the strategy for regional development and
establish a map of regional disparities through underdevelopment indices. However,
criteria for obtaining the special status in the ﬁnancing system have not been redeﬁned
yet. Thus, currently over half of all LGUs in Croatia enjoy the preferential status in the
ﬁscal equalisation system, which does not rely on inequality measures. Therefore, the
effect of the equalisation system is questionable.
The aim of this paper is to measure the equalisation effect (effectiveness) of ﬁscal
equalisation in Croatia. The effectiveness of ﬁscal equalisation instruments will be
assessed by measuring inequalities among LGUs before (ex ante) and after the applica-
tion of those instruments (ex post). Inequalities will be measured with Gini coefﬁcients.
If the value of the Gini coefﬁcient after the application of a certain equalisation
instrument is greater than before, the instrument is not effective in alleviating ﬁscal
inequalities and vice versa.
The paper is structured in ﬁve parts. After the introduction, the second section is
devoted to the literature review and theoretical background. Basic characteristics of ﬁs-
cal equalisation instruments in Croatia and the criteria for their usage are described in
Section 3. The fourth section analyses the effectiveness of the ﬁscal equalisation system
through calculation of the Gini coefﬁcients. The ﬁfth section is the conclusion.
2. Literature review and theoretical background
Fiscal equalisation in Croatia has not been extensively researched, but several papers
have already pointed to problems in the Croatian ﬁscal equalisation system. Bajo and
Bronić (2007) demonstrated that the use of ﬁscal instruments is not associated with the
ﬁscal capacity of LGUs. Bronić (2008b, 2010) indicates the ineffectiveness of the ﬁscal
equalisation system at the county (regional) level and points out the necessity of deter-
mining the extent to which ﬁscal instruments reduce inequalities at the level of cities
and municipalities (local government level). Primorac (2014) proposed the new ﬁscal
equalisation model that alleviates inequalities in the ﬁscal capacities of LGUs much bet-
ter than the existing equalisation system for the same cost. However, the extent to which
individual ﬁscal equalisation instruments reduce inequalities at the local government
level in Croatia has not been determined yet.
The empirical research abounds with a range of different measures to assess ﬁscal
inequalities. Bird and Tarasov (2002) and Portnov and Felsenstein (2010) describe some
of those measures, including the minimum to maximum ratio, minimum (maximum) as
a percentage of the national average, the coefﬁcient of variation, the Theil index, the
Atkinson index, the Williamson index, the Hoover coefﬁcient, the Coulter coefﬁcient
and the Gini coefﬁcient. Besides numerous solutions for numerical expression, inequal-
ity can also be expressed graphically in several ways.3 Probably the most convenient
method for a graphical illustration of inequalities was established by Lorenz (1905).
All those methods have been used in the empirical literature interchangeably to mea-
sure inequalities at lower tiers of government in both federal and unitary states. Shankar
and Shah (2003) use the minimum to maximum ratio, the weighted and unweighted
coefﬁcient of variation, the relative mean deviation, the Theil index as well as the
weighted and unweighted Gini coefﬁcient for measuring ﬁscal inequalities in 18
developing countries. Monfort (2008) employs a wider set of instruments to analyse the
trend of convergence and disparities between regions of the European Union. Blöchliger
(2014) uses the Gini coefﬁcient and the ratio of highest to lowest tax-raising capacity to
measure ﬁscal disparities before and after equalisation in 16 countries (federal countries:
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Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland and unitary
countries: Chile, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey).
UN-HABITAT (2012) presents regional disparities – measured with Gini coefﬁcients –
in Japan before and after equalisation from 1950 until 2002. Hierro, Atienza, and Patiño
(2007) use measures of dispersion (the relative range, the coefﬁcient of variation and
the logarithmic variance) and inequality indexes (the concentration index, the Gini
coefﬁcient, the Reynolds-Smolensky index, the Pechman-Okner index and the reranking
contribution) to measure inequalities in Germany, Australia, Canada, Spain and
Switzerland. They also present inequalities graphically with Lorenz curves. Hofman and
Cordeira Guerra (2004) explore the effect of equalisation systems in East Asian
countries (China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) using descriptive statis-
tics (minimum, maximum, average, max/min, standard deviation and coefﬁcient of
variation).
Although there is no consensus on which of these measures is most appropriate, sev-
eral measures have proven to be more effective and have been used more frequently
than others. Since the Gini coefﬁcient4 has become one of the most commonly used
inequality measures (Portnov & Felsenstein, 2010), it will be used also in this study to
assess the effectiveness of ﬁscal equalisation instruments in Croatia.
3. Croatian ﬁscal equalisation system
The ﬁscal equalisation in Croatia relies on the personal income tax (PIT) revenue shar-
ing and allocation of grants from the central government budget.
The PIT revenue is shared between counties, cities and municipalities, with distribu-
tion coefﬁcients depending on the status of LGUs (City of Zagreb, ASNC, HMA, LGUs
on islands and LGUs without any special status). Owing to different shares in the PIT
revenue, this tax sharing arrangement could have an impact on ﬁscal inequalities if the
preferentially treated LGUs are adequately determined. In general, the PIT is divided
between counties (16%) and cities and municipalities (56.5%). Several LGUs that
assumed the ﬁnancing of decentralised functions retain an additional PIT share (3.1%
for primary education, 2.2% for secondary education, 2.2% for social welfare, 3.2% for
health care and 1.3% for ﬁre protection – a total of 12% in the case of assuming all
decentralised functions). LGUs on ASNC and HMA enjoy the privileged position in the
PIT revenue sharing. They retain 90% of the PIT collected in their area, while counties
they belong to get only 10% of the PIT revenue. In addition, LGUs in ASNC and
HMA do not participate in the ﬁnancing of the equalisation fund for decentralised func-
tions. For LGUs (cities) with only certain parts of the territory belonging to the ASNC,
the standard allocation of the PIT revenue applies (see Table 1).










Islands 16.0 56.5 12.0 15.5
Standard 16.0 56.5 12.0 15.5
Source: The Law on Financing of Local and Regional Self-government OG 117/93, 33/00, 59/01, 107/01, 117/
01, 150/02, 147/03, 132/06, 73/08 and 25/12.
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The privileged status of LGUs on islands is evident from the release of these units
from the obligation of ﬁnancing the equalisation fund for decentralised functions. With
15.5% of the PIT revenue (which other LGUs transfer to the equalisation fund), those
LGUs ﬁnance their capital projects. This method of capital projects ﬁnancing is not very
common in the rest of the world. Usually, unconditional (matching or nonmatching)
capital grants are used for this purpose, taking into account the economic abilities and
ﬁnancial capacities of LGUs (Bajo & Bronić, 2007).
Apart from the tax revenue sharing, ﬁscal inequalities in Croatia are alleviated
through the distribution of current grants from the central government budget. There are
several different types of current grants assigned to LGUs in this respect. These are:
• equalisation grants for decentralised functions,
• current grants of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to counties
• current grants of the MOF to cities in ASNC I and II,
• current grants as a substitute for the corporate income tax (CIT) and
• grants through the PIT return.
Through ﬁscal decentralisation, local and regional governments are enabled to take
on the responsibility for providing decentralised functions (primary education, secondary
education, social welfare, health care and ﬁre protection). LGUs that have taken over
decentralised functions but do not have sufﬁcient funds to meet the minimum ﬁnancial
standards (even with the additional PIT share) are beneﬁciaries of the equalisation fund
for decentralised functions, i.e. they receive equalisation grants for decentralised
functions.
For the purpose of the tax relief of the population inhabiting LGUs in the ASNC
and HMA, that group of taxpayers enjoy an increased basic personal allowance (accord-
ing to the status at ASNC I, II III or HMA). The amount of the basic personal allow-
ance reduces the PIT tax base and therefore also the potential tax revenue of LGUs in
these areas. This in turn neutralises the effect of the assignment of the preferential treat-
ment in the tax sharing system that allows LGUs in ASNC and HMA to retain greater
shares of the PIT revenue. To avoid cancelling of the above measures, the central gov-
ernment has undertaken the ﬁnancing of the annual PIT return that residents of LGUs in
ASNC and HMA use in order to claim the tax beneﬁts resulting from the increased
personal allowance.
Besides grants from the central government budget in the form of the PIT return,
LGUs in ASNC and HMA also receive grants in the amount of the CIT collected in
their area. The reason for this is compensating for the loss of the CIT due to the tax
sharing reform, which completely centralised revenue from the CIT (shared until 2007)
(see Table 2).
Lastly, Annual State Budget Execution Acts determine the value of current MOF’s
grants to LGUs. These grants are allocated to counties and LGUs in the ASNC I and II.
LGUs in ASNC I and II can use the MOF’s current grants to ﬁnance material expendi-
ture and energy, as well as investments in capital programmes (except for the purchase
of personal cars). On the other hand, counties may use the grants received only for
investment in capital programmes (except for the purchase of personal cars).
It is important to point out that counties can retain only up to 25% of grants for
their own purposes, while at least 75% must be distributed to LGUs in their area, LGUs
that are not direct beneﬁciaries of the grant, i.e. LGUs that are not located in ASNC
group I or II. The county assembly prescribes the distribution criteria (see Figure 1).
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The major drawback of these grants is the fact that counties have self-prescribing
distribution criteria with questionable validity and consistency (for the detailed list of
criteria see Appendix 1). Because of uneven distribution criteria, grants – that could
potentially mitigate ﬁscal inequalities among LGUs in individual counties – can hardly
be effective at the national level.
4. The effectiveness of ﬁscal instruments
The effectiveness of the ﬁscal equalisation system is assessed by measuring inequalities
in per capita ﬁscal capacities of LGUs. Fiscal inequalities are quantiﬁed with the Gini
coefﬁcient before and after the application of ﬁscal equalisation instruments. The Gini
coefﬁcient ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 represents complete equality and 1 complete
inequality. In line with that, if the value of the Gini coefﬁcient after the application of
Table 2. Criteria for the calculation and distribution of the MOF’s current grants to counties and
LGUs in ASNC I and II from 2005 to 2011.
LGUs in ASNC I and IIa Countiesb
Population according to the 2001 census Population according to the 2001 census
Average LGUs’ revenue per capita (state average)
two years ago
Average counties’ revenue per capita
(state average) two years ago
Average LGUs’ revenue per capita in certain group
of ASNC
Average county’s revenue per capita two
years ago
Population per km2 in ASNC groups I and II (group
average)
Population of Croatia (without City of
Zagreb) per km2 (state average)
LGU’s population per km2 Population of individual counties’ per
km2
Share of expenditure for capital programmes in total
expenditure (two years ago)
Rationality of the execution of systemic functions
(number of employees, expenditure per employee)
Expenditures for the functions of the city (under
30,000 inhabitants) two years ago
Notes: aFor detailed explanation of the distribution formula see (Bronić, 2008a).
bFor detailed analysis of the formula see (Bronić, 2010).
Source: Annual State Budget Execution Acts from 2005 to 2010.
Figure 1. Distribution of the MOF’s current grant to counties and LGUs in ASNC I and II.
Source: Author based on Annual State Budget Execution Acts
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certain equalisation instrument is greater than before – the instrument is not effective in
alleviating ﬁscal inequalities and vice versa.
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2008) deﬁne the term ﬁscal capacity as the ability
of the particular area to collect revenue for public consumption, with a given level of
economic activity within the boundaries of that area and the authority for deriving pub-
lic revenue from these activities. Accordingly, the ﬁscal capacity of LGUs in Croatia is
determined as the per capita income of LGUs reduced by aid from abroad and from
entities within the general government and the portion of income obtained through
equalisation grants for decentralised functions.
Since the Gini coefﬁcient treats all LGUs in the same way, analysts often use
derivative forms of a Gini coefﬁcient weighted by GDP, population or area (surface). In
this way, it is possible to calculate the Gini coefﬁcients sensitive to extreme values of
variables of interest in LGUs with high GDP, large population or spacious LGUs. At
the same time, for example, given that rural areas tend to have fewer residents than
urban, the Gini coefﬁcient weighted by population systematically underestimates the dif-
ferences between rural and urban areas (Spiezia, 2003). Similar problems are associated
with other forms of weighted Gini coefﬁcients.
Since GDP data for LGUs in Croatia are not available, the unweighted Gini coefﬁ-
cient and Gini coefﬁcients weighted by area and population are used to measure ﬁscal
inequalities of LGUs. Nevertheless, the interpretation is conﬁned exclusively to the
unweighted Gini coefﬁcient. This is because the unweighted Gini most vividly reﬂects
inequalities in Croatia that are probably most pronounced exactly between rural and
urban areas. In addition, the results reveal that – at least in terms of effectiveness of cer-
tain ﬁscal equalisation instruments – Gini coefﬁcients weighted by area and population
generally do not signiﬁcantly deviate from those unweighted (see Table 3).
The Gini coefﬁcients indicate that all grants, except grants from the equalisation
fund for decentralised functions, have a positive but a relatively low impact on the
alleviation of ﬁscal disparities among LGUs.
Apart from the direct distribution of grants from the central government budget to
LGUs, the distribution of grants to LGUs is partially done through counties. Counties








Fiscal capacity before grants 0.3832 0.3558 0.3448
Grants from equalisation fund for decentralised
functions
0.3860 0.3645 0.3516
Grants as a substitute for the CIT 0.3794 0.3492 0.3488
Grants through the PIT return 0.3610 0.3229 0.3373
MOF’s grants to LGUs in ASNC I and II 0.3755 0.3474 0.3346
MOF’s grants to LGUs outside ASNC I and II
(through counties)
0.3771 0.3503 0.3400
Total MOF’s grants 0.3693 0.3419 0.3298
Total (all grants) 0.3528 0.3171 0.3372
Note: The Gini coefﬁcient for the ‘ﬁscal capacity before grants’ refers to ﬁscal inequalities before the distribu-
tion of grants to LGUs, while other coefﬁcients indicate inequalities after the distribution of certain grants.




are required to pass on at least 75% of grants received from the MOF to LGUs (which
are not direct beneﬁciaries of grants) based on criteria set by the county assembly.
Given the different distribution criteria set in individual counties, these grants have a
poor performance in ﬁscal equalisation at the national level. However, they might be
more effective in alleviating ﬁscal disparities among LGUs at the county level. This
hypothesis can be tested by calculating the Gini coefﬁcient of per capita ﬁscal capacities
of LGUs in each county before and after the distribution of grants.
For a better insight into the effectiveness of these grants, Table 4 provides an index
calculated as a ratio of the Gini coefﬁcient after and before the distribution of grants.
Values lower than 1 indicate a decrease in the Gini coefﬁcient after grants, i.e. the posi-
tive impact of grants on ﬁscal equalisation, while values greater than 1 indicate the
opposite.5
It was not possible to calculate the index for seven counties that did not receive the
MOF’s grant in 2010. Interestingly, the distribution of grants in Sisačko-moslavačka and
Šibensko-kninska counties did not help alleviate ﬁscal disparities among LGUs in their
area, while the distribution of grants in other counties proved to be (more or less)
effective. The most effective county is Brodsko-posavska, followed by Bjelovarsko-
bilogorska, Požeško-slavonska and Vukovarsko-srijemska. Other counties were less
successful.
Since ﬁscal equalisation in Croatia is also performed through the PIT revenue shar-
ing, the effectiveness of this instrument is analysed as well. Besides the Gini coefﬁcient
for ﬁscal capacities of LGUs in the existing PIT sharing scheme, the Gini coefﬁcient is









Zagrebačka 0.2771 n/a n/a
Krapinsko-zagorska 0.1796 0.1771 0.9857
Sisačko-moslavačka 0.2370 0.2385 1.0063
Karlovačka 0.1893 0.1849 0.9767







Primorsko-goranska 0.2153 n/a n/a
Ličko-senjska 0.3480 0.3479 0.9997
Virovitičko-podravska 0.1609 0.1566 0.9733
Požeško-slavonska 0.2080 0.1959 0.9416
Brodsko-posavska 0.1852 0.1642 0.8868
Zadarska 0.3111 n/a n/a
Osječko-baranjska 0.2334 0.2290 0.9808
Šibensko-kninska 0.3541 0.3544 1.0008
Vukovarsko-srijemska 0.2238 0.2131 0.9523
Splitsko-dalmatinska 0.3140 n/a n/a




Međimurska 0.1754 n/a n/a
Source: Author’s calculations.
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also calculated assuming a unique allocation of the PIT revenue. In this regard, two
separate simulations have been conducted with LGUs retaining 100% of the PIT rev-
enue in the ﬁrst and 56.5%6 in the second simulation (see Table 5).
The Gini coefﬁcient of ﬁscal inequalities before the PIT sharing (i.e. if the LGUs
retain the overall PIT revenue collected on their territory) is lower than after the tax
sharing arrangements. This reveals that the current PIT sharing system is ineffective in
mitigating ﬁscal inequalities and conﬁrms the inadequacy of criteria for the preferential
treatment of LGUs in the PIT sharing system.
It should be noted that the Gini coefﬁcient for the existing PIT sharing system also
reﬂects the impact of the additional share in the PIT revenue that some LGUs enjoy due
to the takeover of decentralised functions. Unfortunately, because of the unavailability
of data it was not possible to isolate the PIT revenue that LGUs receive as a compensa-
tion for decentralised functions. Therefore, ﬁscal capacities of LGUs in the current
equalisation system reﬂect not only the relative differences in the PIT revenue resulting
from the different status of LGUs, but also the different scale of public functions decen-
tralised to LGUs. Larger ﬁscal capacities of LGUs that have taken over decentralised
functions are justiﬁed by higher ﬁscal needs. Nevertheless, this should be born in mind
when interpreting the Gini coefﬁcient for other (simulated) PIT sharing arrangements,
which do not take into account additional shares of the PIT revenue for the
decentralised functions assumed.
Tax revenue sharing arrangements in Croatia have changed frequently, affecting the
ﬁscal inequalities of LGUs. The share of LGUs in the PIT revenue was altered several
times in the period from 2002 until 2010. Moreover, the revenue from the CIT – which
was initially shared between the central and lower tiers of government – from 2007
belongs completely to the central government. Figure 2 shows the disparities in LGUs’
ﬁscal capacities with regard to the different ways of allocation of income tax revenue.
Assignment of a larger share of the PIT revenue to LGUs and shifting the CIT rev-
enue completely to the central government in 2007 resulted in a sharp reduction in
inequalities. This is largely because criteria for the preferential treatment of LGUs in the
tax sharing system are inadequately determined. Nevertheless, these ﬁndings should be
interpreted with extreme caution because a number of other factors could also have an
impact on inequalities in the observed period. However, the comparison of these ﬁnd-
ings with the results of simulations – which showed that the complete abandonment of
the PIT revenue to LGUs would have a beneﬁcial effect on alleviating inequalities –
conﬁrms the conclusion about the ineffectiveness of the tax revenue sharing in the
Croatian ﬁscal equalisation system.








Current tax sharing arrangement 0.3832 0.3558 0.3448
Unique distribution scheme (all LGUs retain 100% of the
PIT revenue collected in their respective areas)
0.3661 0.3715 0.3228
Unique distribution scheme (all LGUs retain 56.5% of the
PIT revenue collected in their respective areas)
0.4000 0.3838 0.3524





Fiscal equalisation in Croatia is based on the allocation of the preferential status in the
PIT sharing system and the distribution of current grants from the central government
budget. However, criteria for the application of these ﬁscal instruments do not rely on
the assessment of actual ﬁscal capacities of LGUs. It is questionable to what extent such
a complex system without the long-term strategic commitment really mitigates against
inequalities among LGUs.
The dilemma was resolved by determining the degree of inequality of per capita ﬁs-
cal capacities among LGUs before and after the intervention using certain ﬁscal equal-
isation instruments. The analysis revealed that the grants of the MOF, current grants as
a substitute for the CIT and grants through the PIT return are minimally effective in
alleviating local ﬁscal disparities. On the other hand, grants from the equalisation fund
for decentralised functions are, in this sense, counterproductive. The same applies to the
PIT revenue sharing arrangements. By abolishing the preferential treatment of LGUs in
ASNC, HMA and islands (i.e. by introducing a unique scheme according to which all
LGUs would retain 56.5% of the PIT revenue), ﬁscal inequalities would increase. How-
ever, the complete abolition of the redistribution (tax sharing) and release of the total
PIT revenue to LGUs would reduce ﬁscal inequalities.
In other words, the tax sharing system and the distribution of central government
grants reduce ﬁscal inequalities, but only by the negligible effect, which could be
achieved at much lower cost. The Government and the MOF support LGUs in ASNC,
HMA and islands through the tax sharing and the distribution of current grants. How-
ever, LGUs with below average ﬁscal capacities are not necessarily in these areas. In
order to ﬁnancially support LGUs with weak ﬁscal capacities, it is necessary to intro-
duce a simple and transparent ﬁscal equalisation system. Such a system should be based
on the distribution of general (unconditional) current grants from the central government
to LGUs based on the assessment of their ﬁscal capacities. In this way, it would be
possible to assign each LGU a different (in absolute and relative terms) amount that
minimises differences in LGUs’ ﬁscal capacities.
Figure 2. Fiscal inequalities and LGUs’ share in the PIT and CIT revenue from 2002 to 2010.
Note: The PIT is the share of LGUs in the revenue from the personal income tax, whereas the
CIT is the share in the revenue from the corporate income tax.
Source: Author
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Despite the illusion that the ﬁscal equalisation system in Croatia is developed and
properly organised, it is in fact complex, unclear, non-transparent and inefﬁcient and
requires a comprehensive review and an urgent reform.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. ASNC are determined to achieve more even development of Croatia, encourage demographic
and economic progress, the completion of the reconstruction programme, return to pre-war
population and permanent housing. ASNC are deﬁned into three groups – the ﬁrst and the
second group according to the circumstances occurring as the consequence of aggression on
Croatia, and the third group according to three criteria: the criterion of economic develop-
ment, the criterion of structural problems and demographic criteria. The ﬁrst group includes
areas of cities and municipalities occupied during the war that are located directly along the
state border, with no more than 5000 inhabitants according to the census of 1991, whereby
the city/municipal centre is not more than 15 km away from the state border. This group also
includes other occupied areas of cities, municipalities and villages of the Croatian Danube
region. The second group consists of areas of cities, municipalities and villages that were
occupied during the war but do not belong to the ﬁrst group of ASNC. The third group
includes areas of municipalities and cities evaluated as economically less developed regions
of Croatia.
2. HMA are determined as areas of interest and under special protection in order to encourage
the demographic renewal, settlement and creation of preconditions for efﬁcient use of natural
and economic resources for the economic development. The HMA are areas whose elevation,
slope and vertical stratiﬁcation of the ﬁeld, and conditioned soil, climate and other natural
characteristics represent difﬁcult conditions for life and work of residents.
3. The most commonly used methods include the parade of dwarfs, the frequency distribution
and the Lorenz curve (for a detailed description see Cowell, 2009).
4. See Gini (1912, 1921).
5. Similar indexes have often been calculated and presented in the literature (e.g. Musgrave &
Thin, 1948; Reynolds & Smolensky, 1977).
6. LGUs that do not enjoy the preferential status in the current tax-sharing system retain 56.5%
of the PIT revenue collected in their area.
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Appendix 1. Counties’ criteria for the distribution of MOF’s current grants to
LGUs outside ASNC I and II
County Criteria
Krapinsko-zagorska (2010) (1) The population density is lower than the county’s population
density which is 116 inhabitants per km2,
(2) Revenue up to 5,500,000.00 kuna
Sisačko-moslavačka (2010) (1) The project is developing a new basic infrastructure
(YES / NO),
(2) The project brings beneﬁts for entrepreneurship (YES / NO),
(3) The project includes environmental sustainability (YES / NO),
(4) LGUs participate in the ﬁnancing of the project (YES / NO),
(5) The ﬁnancing of the project involves other sources of
ﬁnancing (YES / NO),
(6) The project affects the increase in LGU’s ﬁscal capacity
(YES / NO)
Karlovačka (2010) (1) The population according to the 2001 census,
(2) Average per capita income for 2008 at the state level
(national average)
(3) Average per capita income per inhabitant of the group
(Article 4 and 5 of the ASNC Act) or individual LGU
(4) Number of inhabitants per 1 km at ASNC group I and II
(group average)
(5) Number of inhabitants per 1 km of individual municipality
and city
(6) The share of expenditures for capital programmes in total
expenditure for the 2008
(7) Rationality for enforcement of systemic functions (number
of employees
(8) Expenditures for the city functions (fewer than 30)
Varaždinska (2011) (1) Second group according to the development index between
50 and 75% of the national average
Koprivničko-križevačka
(2012)
(1) Less than 75% of the county’s average revenue per capita
Bjelovarsko-bilogorska (2011) (1) Coverage of the LGU with the public water supply system
and the need for design and construction of water supply system,
(2) The impact of utility infrastructure projects on the
environment,
(3) The coherence of the utility infrastructure with the County
Development Strategy,
(4) LGUs’ coverage with county and local roads, and the need
for their modernisation and construction,
(5) The impact of the project on the increase of LGU’s or
county’s ﬁscal capacity,
(6) participation in co-ﬁnancing of creating and updating ofﬁcial
spatial databases and real estate cadaster
Ličko-senjska (2010) (1) The population of the city/municipality according to the 2001
census,
(2) Total budgetary revenues and receipts of the city/municipality
for 2008,
(3) Total budgetary revenues and receipts of the city/municipality
for 2008 per capita,
(4) Total budgetary expenditure and expenses of the city/
municipality for 2008,




Source: Counties’ ofﬁcial gazettes for respective years.
Appendix 1. (Continued).
County Criteria
(6) Number of employees on December 31, 2008,
(7) The share of capital expenditures and expenses in total
expenditures and expenses for 2008,
(8) Total expenditures and expenses per employee for 2008,
(9) Total capital expenditures and expenses for 2008 per capita
Virovitičko-podravska (2010) (1) Total budget revenues and receipts (with funds transferred)
for 2008 – equalisation up to 50% of the average,
(2) Non-tax revenues of LGU per capita for 2008 – equalisation
to the average,
(3) Capital revenue per capita for 2008 – equalisation to the
average,
(4) Expenditures for the acquisition of non-ﬁnancial assets for
2008
Požeško-slavonska (2010) (1) The population according to the 2001 census,
(2) Average per capita revenue (county average) and per capita
revenue of municipality/city – 70% of the grant
(3) LGU’s area (surface),
(4) The average population density at the county level and the
density of the LGU – 30% of the grant
Brodsko-posavska (2012) (1) The population according to the 2011 census,
(2) Average per capita revenue (county average) in 2010 and
LGU revenue per capita in 2010
(3) LGU’s area (surface)
(4) The degree of utility construction according to the
infrastructure development standards
(5) The share of expenditures for capital programmes in 2010
(6) Rationality for enforcement of systemic functions (number of
employees
(7) Expenditures for the city functions (fewer than 30)
Zadarska (2008) (1) Average per capita revenue for 2006 (county average),
(2) The share of expenditures for capital investment in total
expenditures,
(3) Rationality for enforcement of systemic functions
(expenditures per employee),
(4) The share of expenditures of employees in total expenditures
Osječko-baranjska (2011) (1) Average revenue per capita for 2009 lower than the county
average
Šibensko-kninska (2013) (1) Revenue per capita in 2011 lower than 75% of the average
revenue per capita at the county level in 2011
Vukovarsko-srijemska (2012) (1) Development index (unemployment rate, per capita income,
budget revenues per capita, general population trends, education
rates),
(2) The share of expenditures for capital programmes in 2011 in
total expenditures
(3) Rationality for enforcement of systemic functions (number of
employees
Međimurska (2009) (1) The population according to the 2001 census (population of
each LGU and population of the county),
(2) Average revenue of the county budget for 2006 per capita and
average LGU’s revenue per capita for 2006
(3) Per capita budget revenue (net of grants)
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